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1Department of Economics, Middlesex University,
The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, U.K.
2Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics,
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Abstract
One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences,
which assume that people care about the monetary payoffs of others. However, during the last ten years,
research has shown that different types of unselfish behaviour, including cooperation, altruism, truth-telling,
altruistic punishment, and trustworthiness are in fact better explained by preferences for following one’s own
personal norms – internal standards about what is right or wrong in a given situation. Beyond better organ-
ising various forms of unselfish behaviour, this moral preference hypothesis has recently also been used to
increase charitable donations, simply by means of interventions that make the morality of an action salient.
Here we review experimental and theoretical work dedicated to this rapidly growing field of research, and
in doing so we outline mathematical foundations for moral preferences that can be used in future models to
better understand selfless human actions and to adjust policies accordingly. These foundations can also be





Most people are not completely selfish. Given the right circumstances, they are happy to give up
a part of their benefit to help other people or the society as a whole. Psychologists and economists
have long observed that some people act unselfishly even in one-shot anonymous interactions,
when there are no direct or indirect benefits for doing so [1, 2]. The question is why? Under-
standing what motivates people to act unselfishly in one-shot, anonymous interactions is of great
theoretical and practical importance. Theoretically, it may lead to a more complete and precise
mathematical framework to formalise human decision-making, while practically, it may suggest
policies and interventions to promote unselfish behaviour, with the ultimate goal of improving our
societies.
To study one-shot unselfishness, behavioural scientists usually turn to laboratory experiments
using economic games, in which experimental subjects have to make monetary decisions that
involve various forms of other-regarding behaviour. In this context, and throughout this review,
selfishness and other-regarding behaviour is defined with respect to monetary payoffs. Clearly,
a behaviour that is unselfish from the point of view of monetary outcomes may turn out to be
selfish from a more general perspective that takes into account also psychological benefits and
costs. For example, some people may engage in unselfish behaviour to decrease negative mood
[3] or increase positive feelings [4]. Therefore, in the last decades, behavioural scientists have been
trying to mathematically explain unselfish behaviour by means of a utility function that depends
on factors other than solely the monetary payoff of the decision maker. Based on empirical data
scholars have initially advanced the explanation that human unselfishness in one-shot anonymous
interactions is primarily driven by people not caring only about their own monetary payoff, but
caring, at least to some extent, also about the monetary payoffs of the other people involved in the
interaction [5–10].
However, about fifteen years ago, this social preference hypothesis came under critique because
some experiments showed that two particular forms of unselfish behaviour, altruistic punishment
and altruism, could not be entirely explained by preferences defined solely over monetary out-
comes. In 2010, building on work on the effect of social norms on people’s behaviour [11–20],
Bicchieri and Chavez [21] proposed to explain altruistic punishment assuming that people have
preferences for following their “personal norms” (what they personally believe to be the right thing
to do) beyond the monetary consequences that this action brings about. Subsequently, Krupka and
2
Weber [22] proposed to explain altruism using “injunctive norms” (what one believes others would
approve/disapprove); however, in their analysis, they did not consider a potential role of personal
norms. In the last five years, numerous other experiments challenged social preference models
in several behavioural domains, other than altruistic punishment and altruism [23–30]; moreover,
the best interpretation of these results turns out to be in terms of personal norms, rather than other
types of norms. Namely, the best way to organise these results is through the moral preference
hypothesis, according to which people have preferences for following their personal norms, be-
yond the economic consequences that these actions bring about. This framework organises several
forms of one-shot, anonymous unselfish behaviour, including cooperation, altruism, altruistic pun-
ishment, trustworthiness, honesty, and the equality-efficiency trade-off. We note at this stage that
personal norms are not universally given. They certainly depend on the culture; for example, they
can come from the internalisation of cultural values [15]. But they can also depend on the indi-
vidual; anecdotal evidence suggests that, even within the same family, there might be people with
different beliefs about what is right or wrong in a given situations. We will discuss this in more
details in Section VII F.
The moral preference hypothesis also holds promise of being very useful in practice. The idea is
simple. If people care about doing the right thing, then just providing cues that make the rightness
of an action salient should work just fine in promoting desirable behaviour. In fact, research
has already demonstrated the applicability of this approach outside of the laboratory, showing in
particular that nudges towards doing the right thing can increase charitable donations [31].
In the light of ample empirical research supporting the moral preference hypothesis, theoretical
research aiming to formalise human decision-making by means of a mathematical framework is
also at a crossroads. On the one hand, the traditional approach involving monetary payoffs has
worked well in explaining many challenging aspects of pro-social behaviour. But on the other,
experiments indicate that there are likely hard boundaries to this simplistic approach, which will
thus have to be amended by more avant-garde concepts, including formalising the intangibles of
moral psychology and philosophy.
Here we review this rapidly growing field of research within the following sections. Section
II reviews the main economic games that have been developed to study one-shot unselfishness.
Section III reviews social preference models, as earlier attempts to explain unselfishness in one-
shot economic games within a unified theoretical framework. This section also describes a number
of experiments that violate social preference models. Section IV shows how these experiments
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can be organised by general moral preferences for doing what one believes to be the right thing.
Section V focuses on practical applications of the moral preference hypothesis. Section VI reviews
the models of moral preferences that have been introduced so far and proposes a new model that
explicitly takes into account the importance of personal norms. Lastly, Section VII outlines a
number of key questions for future work, while Section VIII summarises the main conclusions.
Taken together, this review thus outlines a mathematical formalism for morality, which shall
inform future models aimed at better understanding selfless actions as well as artificial intelligence
that strives to emulate counterintuitive human decision-making.
II. MEASURES OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOUR
There are various forms of unselfish behaviour. For example, giving money to a homeless per-
son on the street is, in principle, quite different from collaborating with a colleague on a common
project, or from telling the truth when one is tempted to lie. To take this source of heterogeneity
into account, scholars have developed a series of simple games and decision problems that are
meant to prototypically represent different types of unselfish behaviour. These are simple scenar-
ios in which experimental subjects can make decisions that have real consequences. To incentivise
these decisions, behavioural scientists usually use monetary payoffs (at least among adult subjects,
whereas other forms of remuneration, such as stickers, might be more effective among children).
In this review, we will be mainly focused on one-shot decisions that are purely unselfish, mean-
ing that they bring no monetary benefit to the decision maker (and possibly bring a cost), no
matter the beliefs of the decision maker regarding the behaviour of other people involved in the
interaction. Specifically, we measure altruistic behaviour using the dictator game (see Table 1 for
all the definitions), cooperative behaviour in pairwise interactions using the prisoner’s dilemma,
truth-telling using the sender-receiver game, the tradeoff between equality and efficiency using the
trade-off game, trustworthiness using player 2 in the trust game, and altruistic punishment using
Player 2 in the ultimatum game. In the last section we will also briefly consider decisions that are
strategically unselfish, such as trust (player 1 in the trust game) and strategic fairness (player 1 in
the ultimatum game), which might actually maximise the payoff of the decision maker, depending
on their beliefs about the behaviour of the second player. The distinction between pure unselfish-
ness and strategic unselfishness generalises the distinction between pure cooperation and strategic
cooperation, introduced by Rand in his meta-analysis [32].
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III. SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Behavioural scientists have long recognised that some people do act unselfishly even in one-
shot anonymous interactions. For example, the first comprehensive empirical work on the one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma dates back to 1965 [1]. Formal frameworks to explain one-shot unselfishness
have a more recent history, starting in 1994, when Ledyard observed that cooperation, altruism,
and altruistic punishment could be explained by assuming that people maximise a utility function
that depends not only on their own monetary payoff, but also on the total monetary payoff of
the other people that are involved in the interaction [5]. See Table 2 for the exact mathematical
definition. Since then, several models have been introduced. In 1998, Levine [6] proposed a
utility function in which the level of altruism depends on the level of altruism of the other players.
Subsequently, in 1999, Fehr and Schmidt [7] proposed a framework according to which players
care about minimising inequities. In 2000, Bolton and Ockenfels [8] followed a similar idea and
introduced a general inequity aversion model, in which the utility of an action depends negatively
on the distance between the amount of money the decision maker gets if that action is implemented
and the amount of money the decision maker would get if the equal allocation were implemented.
The authors proposed an explicit mathematical formula only for the case of n = 2 players. In 2002,
Andreoni and Miller [9] estimated the behaviour of experimental subjects in a number of dictator
game choices using a specific utility function taking into account altruistic tendencies as well as
potential convexity in the preferences. In the same year, Charness and Rabin [10] introduced a
general utility function which, depending on the relative relationship between its two parameters,
can cover several cases, including competitive preferences, inequity aversion preferences, and
social efficiency preferences. We refer to Table 2 for the exact functional forms. (Besides these
models, scholars have also studied models that can be applied to specific subsets of one-shot
anonymous interactions (e.g., [4]). In this review, we focus on models that can be applied to any
one-shot anonymous interaction involving unselfish behaviour).
While differing in many details, all social preference models share one common property: they
assume that the utility of a decision maker is a function of the monetary payoffs of the available
actions. This assumption came under considerable criticism for the first time in 2003 when Falk,
Fehr and Fischbacher [33] showed that rejection rates in the ultimatum game depend on the choice
set available to the proposer. Specifically, the split (8,2) — 8 to the proposer and 2 to the responder
— is more likely to be accepted in ultimatum games in which the only other choice available to
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the proposer is (10,0), compared to ultimatum games in which the only other choice available to
the proposer is (5,5). Therefore, responders prefer accepting (8,2) over rejecting it in the former
case, but they prefer rejecting (8,2) over accepting it in the latter one, despite the fact that these
choices have the same monetary consequences in the two cases. Clearly, this cannot be explained
by any model of social preferences. See [21, 26] for conceptual replications.
Shortly after, in 2005, Uri Gneezy introduced the sender-receiver game [34]. In his experi-
ments, decision makers were less likely to implement an allocation of money when implementing
this allocation also required misreporting a private information. Also this finding cannot be ex-
plained by any model of social preferences and, more generally, also not by any utility function
that depends only on the monetary payoffs that are associated with the available actions. This thus
indicates that (some) people have an intrinsic cost of lying, which goes beyond their preferences
toward monetary outcomes. To further support this interpretation, several scholars have indepen-
dently studied the sender-receiver game in contexts in which lying would benefit both the sender
and the receiver to the same extent. This case is particularly important because, when the benefit
for the sender is equal to the benefit for the receiver, all social preference models predict that the
totality of people would lie. However, this prediction turned out to be violated in experiments,
which showed that a significant proportion of people tell the truth [23, 35, 36].
Subsequently social preference models came under critique also in one of the behavioural do-
mains in which they had been most successful, namely in research involving the dictator game.
Dana, Cain and Dawes [37] and Lazear, Malmendier and Weber [38] observed that some dictator
game givers would prefer to altogether avoid the dictator game interaction if given the chance.
These people thus preferred giving over keeping in a context in which they were forced to play the
dictator game, but preferred keeping over giving in a context in which they could choose whether
to play the dictator game or not. This finding, as in the preceding examples, cannot be explained
by any utility function that is based solely on monetary outcomes.
For the same game, and along similar lines, List [39], Bardsley [40], and Cappelen et al. [41]
found that extending the choice set of the dictator by adding the possibility to take money from
the recipient has the effect to make some dictators less likely to give. Therefore, these dictators
preferred giving over keeping, when the taking option was not available, but preferred keeping
over giving, when the taking option was available. This finding likewise cannot be explained by
any preference over monetary payoffs. A conceptually similar point was also made by Krupka and
Weber [22] and Capraro and Vanzo [29], who found that even minor changes in the instructions of
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the dictator game can notably impact people’s behaviour.
In the years after 2013, the inability of purely monetary-based models to explain empirically
observed behaviour engulfed many other games and decision problems, whose experimental reg-
ularities had been previously thought to be explainable in terms of social preferences. Examples
included the prisoner’s dilemma [25, 27], the trust game [25], as well as different variants of the
trade-off game [27, 28, 30], thus resulting in a crisis of the social preference hypothesis.
IV. THE RISE OF THE MORAL PREFERENCE HYPOTHESIS
To solve a crisis, one needs a paradigm shift. The shift started in 2010, when Bicchieri and
Chavez [21] proposed an elegant solution for one of the aforementioned empirical observations.
This solution builds on classic work suggesting that, in everyday life, people’s behaviour is partly
determined by what they believe to be the norms in a given context [11–20]. This observation
led behavioural scientists to propose several classifications of norms. Particularly relevant for the
thesis of this review is the distinction between personal and social norms [15]. And moreover,
among the social norms, the distinction between injunctive and descriptive norms [17]. Personal
norms refer to internal standards about what is right or wrong in a given situation; injunctive norms
refer to what other people approve or disapprove of in that situation; descriptive norms refer to
what other people actually do. In one-shot anonymous games, like the games considered in this
review, the distinction among personal, descriptive, and injunctive norms roughly corresponds to
Bicchieri’s personal normative beliefs, empirical expectations, and normative expectations [18].
See Table 3 for precise definitions.
The groundbreaking intuition of Bicchieri and Chavez [21] was to apply the theory of norms to
deviations from monetary-based social preferences in the ultimatum game. Specifically, Bicchieri
and Chavez showed that the ultimatum game offer that is consider to be fair by responders depends
on the choice set available to the proposer; moreover, responders tend to reject offers that they
consider unfair. This suggests that altruistic punishment is driven by responders following their
personal norms, beyond the monetary consequences that these actions bring about. In particular,
this explains the aforementioned results of Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher [33], that responders reject
the same offer at different rates depending on the other offers available to the proposer.
Shortly after, in 2013, Krupka and Weber [22] applied a similar approach to several variants
of the dictator game. However, instead of focusing on personal norms, they focused on injunctive
7
norms. For each of the available actions, subjects were asked to declare whether they found
the corresponding action to be “very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially inappropriate”,
“somewhat socially appropriate”, or “very socially appropriate”. Subjects were given a monetary
prize if they matched the modal choice made by other participants. Observe that, in this way,
Krupka and Weber incentivised the elicitation of the injunctive norm. (The elicitation of personal
norms cannot be incentivised.) In doing so, Krupka and Weber found that people believe that
others think that avoiding a dictator game interaction is far less socially inappropriate than keeping
the whole amount of money in a dictator game that one is obliged to play. Therefore, the empirical
results summarised above regarding dictator games with an exit option [37, 38] can be explained
simply by a change in the perception of what is the injunctive norm in that context. Similarly,
Krupka and Weber found that people believe that others think that keeping the money in a dictator
game with a taking option is far less socially inappropriate than keeping the money in the dictator
game without the taking option. In this way, they could explain also the results of List [39],
Bardsley [40], and Cappelen et al. [41] in terms of a change in the perception of the injunctive
norm. Finally, Krupka and Weber presented a novel experiment in which subjects played the
dictator game in either of two variants: in the Standard variant, dictators started with $10 and had
to decide how much of it, if any, to give to the recipient; in the Bully variant, the money was
initially split equally among the dictator and the recipient, and the dictator could either give, take,
or do nothing. The authors found that people were more altruistic in the Bully variant compared to
the Standard variant, and this was driven by the fact that people rated “taking from the recipient”
far less socially appropriate than “not giving to the recipient”.
The work of Krupka and Weber suggests that taking into account injunctive norms is important
to explain deviations from social preference models in the dictator game. But are the injunctive
norms really the main force behind the observed behavioural changes, or are there also other norms
playing more primary roles? In the last five years, a set of empirical studies tried to address this
question. Schram and Charness [24] analysed the behaviour of dictators who were given an advice
from third parties about the injunctive norm. They observed that dictators became more pro-social
only when their choices were made public. By contrast, when their choices remained private, they
found no significant increase in pro-sociality, compared to the case in which they did not receive
any information about the injunctive norm. These results indicate that, although injunctive norms
might correlationally explain behavioural changes in anonymous (and thus private) dictator game
experiments, they are unlikely to be the primary motivation. In fact, being that these games were
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played anonymously, in front of the screen of a computer, the intuition suggests that the norms
primarily at play are the personal norms. Two recent works provide evidence for this hypothesis.
Capraro and Vanzo [29] found that framing effects in the dictator game generated by morally
loaded instructions can be explained by changes in the perception of what people “personally think
to be the right thing” in the given context (i.e., their personal norms). Capraro et al. [31] showed
that making personal norms salient prior to playing the dictator game (by asking subjects to state
what they personally think to be the morally right thing to do) has a strong effect on subsequent
dictator game donations, even persisting to a second-stage prisoner’s dilemma interaction.
This set of works thus suggests that dictator game giving is driven by personal norms. Putting
this together with the results of Bicchieri and Chavez, we obtain that both altruism and altruistic
punishment can be explained by people following their personal norms.
More recently, this finding has been not only replicated, but, more importantly, also extended
to explain several other forms of unselfish behaviour. In 2016, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov [25]
introduced a task “that measures subjects’ preferences for following rules and norms, in a context
that has nothing to do with social interaction or distributional concerns”. They found that this
measure of norm-sensitivity predicts dictator game altruism, trust game trustworthiness (but not
trust), and ultimatum game rejection thresholds (but not offers). Taken together, this indicates that
altruism, trustworthiness, and altruistic punishment are driven by a common desire to adhere to a
personal norm. In 2017, Eriksson et al. [26] conducted an ultimatum game experiment under two
different conditions. The difference, however, was only in the labels that were used to describe the
action of refusing the proposer’s offer. In one treatment, this action was labeled “rejecting the pro-
poser’s offer”, while in the other treatment, the same action was labeled “reducing the proposer’s
payoff”. Since these two options are monetarily equivalent, any utility function depending only
on the monetary payoffs of the available actions predict that responders should behave the same
way in both cases. But contrary to this prediction, Eriksson et al. found that responders displayed
higher rejection thresholds in the “rejection frame” than in the “reduction frame”. Moreover, they
showed that the observed framing effect could be explained by a change in what people think to
be the right thing to do. Specifically, subjects tended to rate the action of reducing the proposer’s
offer to be morally worse than the action of rejecting the proposer’s offer, in spite of the fact that
these two actions had the same monetary consequences. In 2018, Capraro and Rand [27] showed
that behaviour in the trade-off game is highly sensitive to the labels used to describe the available
actions. In line with Eriksson et al. [26], Capraro and Rand also found that their framing effects
9
could be explained by a change in what people think to be the right thing to do. Notably, fram-
ing effects in the trade-off game have been replicated several times [28, 30, 42–44] and a recent
work has shown that these moral framings tap into relatively internalised moral preferences [44].
Moreover, Capraro and Rand also considered a situation in which the personal norm conflicted
with the descriptive norm, and found that people tend to follow the personal norm, rather than
the descriptive norm. The same research also revealed a correlation between the framing effect
in the trade-off game and giving in the dictator game and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma,
thus indicating that not only trade-off decisions are driven by personal norms, but that altruism
and cooperation are also subject to that same facilitator. Cooperative behaviour is also typically
correlated to altruistic behaviour [45–47], suggesting that they are driven by a common underlying
motivation.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no works directly exploring the role of personal norms
on truth-telling in the sender-receiver game. However, Biziou-van-Pol et al. [23] have shown that
there is a positive correlation between truth-telling in the sender-receiver game (in the Pareto white
lie condition), giving in the dictator game, and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, suggesting
that these types of behaviours are driven by a common motivation. Since the aforementioned
research suggests that altruism and cooperation are driven by personal norms, this correlation
suggests that lying aversion is so too.
In sum, research accumulated in the last ten years suggests that several forms of one-shot,
anonymous unselfishness, including altruism, altruistic punishment, truth-telling, cooperation,
trustworthiness, and the equality-efficiency trade-off, can be explained using a unified theoretical
framework, whereby people have moral preferences for following their personal norms, beyond
the monetary payoff that these actions bring about. Of course, this is not meant to imply that mon-
etary payoffs do not play any role in explaining one-shot unselfishness, but simply that something
else, in addition to monetary payoffs, should be taken into account. The thesis is that this ‘some-
thing else’ are the personal norms, which gives rise to the moral preference hypothesis as described
in Table 4. Also, this is not meant to imply that other types of norms play no role in these forms of
one-shot selfless behaviour. For example, nudging the injunctive norm in the prisoner’s dilemma
[31] and in the trade-off game [48] has a similar effect as nudging the personal norm. Moreover,
it is possible that social norms ultimately drive personal norms, because they allow to enhance or
preserve one’s sense of self-worth and avoid self-concept distress, resulting in a self-reinforcing
behaviour that eventually benefits one’s own self-image [15]. However, the aforementioned liter-
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ature suggests that, at a proximate level, personal norms have a greater explanatory power, in the
sense that they consistently explain people’s behaviour also in games where injunctive norms have
been shown to play a limited role (e.g., dictator game) or where descriptive norms play a limited
role (e.g., the trade-off game).
V. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Behavioural scientists and policy makers have been using norm-based interventions to foster
pro-sociality in real life for decades [49–60]. Although these paternalistic interventions have been
criticised because they subtly violate people’s freedom of choice [61] and can be exploited by ma-
licious institutions [62] (see [63] for a response to these critiques), they are well-studied because,
compared to standard procedures to foster pro-sociality (punishment and rewards), they allow to
save the monitoring cost that the institution needs to pay in order to know who to punish or reward.
Norm-based interventions typically manipulate the descriptive or the injunctive norm in a given
context, and show that this has an effect on people’s behaviour in that same context. The more re-
cent works reviewed in the previous section, showing that unselfish behaviour in one-shot, anony-
mous economic games is primarily driven by a desire to follow the personal norms, suggest that
a more effective mechanism to increase pro-sociality might be to use norm-based interventions
that target personal norms, rather than social norms. The interest in targeting personal norms,
compared to other mechanisms to promote pro-sociality, is also that targeting personal norms is
potentially cheaper than other mechanisms. Clearly, it is cheaper than punishment and rewards be-
cause it avoids the monitoring cost. Additionally, it saves the cost of collecting information about
the behaviour or the moral judgments of other people, which forms the basis of interventions
targeting social norms.
In recent years, there has been a growing body of research exploring the effect of nudging
personal norms on various forms of unselfish behaviour. Some works using economic games found
that making personal norms salient increases donations in the dictator game [31, 64], cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma [31, 65], as well as decreases in-group favouritism, at least on average
[66]. This suggests that nudging personal norms might be effective to increase pro-sociality in
one-shot anonymous decisions that have consequences outside the laboratory. Along these lines,
Capraro et al. [31] found that asking people to report what they personally think is the morally
right thing to do increases crowdsourced charitable donations by 44%.
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VI. MODELS OF MORAL PREFERENCES
We have thus seen that several forms of unselfish behaviour can be organised by moral prefer-
ences for following the personal norms. The question is, can we model this using a formal utility
function?
There have been some attempts to formalise people’s tendency to follow a norm [22, 25, 67–
75]. Most of these models, however, are either very specific in the sense that they can be applied
only to certain games, or do not distinguish among different types of norms. Three models can be
applied to every game of interest in this review (and, more generally, to every one-shot game) and
distinguish among different types of norms.
Levitt and List [68] introduced a model where the utility of an action a depends on the mon-
etary payoff associated to that action, vi(πi(a)), as well as on the moral cost (or benefit), m(a),
associated to that action:
ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) +m(a).
Levitt and List assumed that the moral cost (or benefit) depends primarily on three factors:
whether the action is recorded or performed in the presence of an observer, whether the action
has negative consequences on other players, and whether the action is in line with “social norms
or legal rules that govern behavior in a particular society”. Therefore, Levitt and List’s model,
although useful in many circumstances, it does only mention social norms, while ignoring the
effect of personal norms.
A similar model was considered by Krupka and Weber [22], with the key difference that they
focused on injunctive norms specifically. Krupka and Weber introduced a function N defined over
the set of available actions that, given an action a, returns a number N(a) representing the extent
to which society views a as socially appropriate. They also assumed that people are heterogeneous
in the extent to which they care about doing what society considers to be appropriate. In doing so,
they obtain the utility function:
ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) + γiN(a).
As mentioned above, one of the main contributions of Krupka and Weber was to introduce an
experimental technique to elicit the injunctive norm. To this end, they asked participants to rate
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each of the available actions in terms of their social appropriateness. Participants were incentivised
to match the modal choice of the other participants.
Very recently, in 2020, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov presented a different approach, but still
based on injunctive norms [75]. Specifically, they introduced the utility function
ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) + φiη(a),
where φi represents the extent to which i cares about following the injunctive norm, and η(a)
represents a measure of whether the society thinks that a is socially appropriate. Although this
utility function looks very similar to the one proposed by Krupka and Weber, it differs from it
in one important dimension. While Krupka and Weber’s social appropriateness, N(a), is com-
puted by asking participants what they think others would approve or disapprove (and therefore
it need not depend only on the monetary consequences of the available actions), Kimbrough and
Vostroknutov’s injunctive norm, η, is built axiomatically from the game and it is assumed to be
inversely proportional to the overall dissatisfaction of the players, defined as the difference be-
tween what they get in a given scenario and what they could have gotten in others. This implies
that one limitation of this approach is that people always prefer Pareto dominant allocations over
Pareto dominated ones. But, in experiments, this property is not always satisfied. For example,
when lying is Pareto dominant, some people still tell the truth, and these people tend to cooperate
in a subsequent prisoner’s dilemma and give in a subsequent dictator game [23]. Moreover, in
trade-off games framed in such a way that the Pareto dominant allocation is presented as morally
wrong, people tend to choose the Pareto dominated option [27, 28].
In sum, previous formal models consider only social norms or, more specifically, injunctive
norms. But, as we have seen in the previous sections, unselfish behaviour in one-shot anonymous
interactions is often driven by personal norms, rather than by social norms. Taking inspiration
from the above models, one can formalise this using the utility function:
ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) + µiPi(a),
where µi represents the extent to which player i cares about doing what s/he personally thinks
to be the morally right thing to do and Pi(a) represents the extent to which i personally thinks
that a is morally right. This functional form might superficially seem similar to the ones discussed
earlier, but it differs from those in two important points. One point is that the personal norm Pi(a)
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typically depends on the individual i, whereas the injunctive norm depends only on the society in
which the individual lives. The second point is the very fact that Pi represents the extent to which i
thinks that a is the morally right thing to do, whereasm(a), N(a), and η(a) represent social norms.
In general, the personal norm might not be aligned with the social norms. In practice, Pi(a) can
be estimated using a suitable experiment, whereas µi and vi can be estimated, on average, using
statistical techniques, following a similar method as the one developed by Krupka and Weber for
injunctive norms [22]. Specifically, one can estimate Pi(a) by asking subjects to self-report the
extent to which they personally think that action a is the morally right thing to do. Then one
can use these ratings to predict the behaviour, using a simple regression. The coefficient of this
regression will give the average of the µi’s. Also, putting the monetary payoffs in the regression,
one can also get an estimation for the average of the vi’s.
This utility function based on personal norms has a greater predictive power than its counter-
parts based only on social norms, in the sense that it explains behaviour in a larger set of games,
compared to their counterparts based on social norms. We have seen earlier that Schram and Char-
ness [24] found that making the injunctive norm salient does not increases altruistic behaviour in
the anonymous dictator game. D’Adda et al. [53] found that making the descriptive norm salient
has only a marginally significant effect on anonymous dictator game giving; this effect also van-
ishes in a second interaction, played immediately after. Along the same lines, Dimant, van Kleef
and Shalvi [76] found that promoting the injunctive norm and promoting the descriptive norm does
not have any effect on people’s honesty in a deception game in which subjects can lie for their ben-
efit. On the other hand, numerous works have shown that nudging personal norms impacts several
forms of unselfish behaviour, ranging from altruism [31, 64], altruistic punishment [26], cooper-
ation [31, 65], and the equality-efficiency trade-off [27]. Moreover, the effect typically persists
for at least another interaction and even spills across contexts [31]. All these results are consistent
with a utility function based on personal norms and are not consistent with a utility function based
only on social norms.
We present a summary of all above-discussed moral preference models in Table 5.
VII. FUTURE WORK
This is an exciting field of research, which provides a unified view of human choices in several
contexts of decision-making, while having, at the same time, significant practical implications.
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Nonetheless, there are several questions that need to be explored in future research, as detailed in
what follows and summarised in Table 6.
A. The utility function
From a mechanistic perspective, the moral preference hypothesis raises the question of how can
we express the utility function of a decision maker. Scholars have tried to give mathematical sense
to people’s morality since the foundation of mathematical economics [77, 78]. About two centuries
later, the question is still open, even in the simple setting of one-shot anonymous interactions. One
simple way to do so is to assume that people are torn between maximising their monetary payoff
and doing what they personally think to be the morally right thing. This can be done with a utility
function of the shape ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) + µiPi(a). Although this utility function outperforms
their counterparts based on social norms, as well as social preferences, it undoubtedly represents
just a first candidate. Future work should explore other ways to formalise moral preferences,
through finer experiments with the power to detect small variations in how people weight their
personal norm against monetary incentives. Future work should also find ways to estimate what
people think to be the right thing in a given context, without asking it to the participants in a
separate experiment. The literature reviewed above shows that, in many cases, it is enough to
change only one word in the instructions of a decision problem to change people’s perception of
what is the right thing to do in a given context. This suggests that Pi(a) partly depends on the
language in which the action a is presented. Exploring this dependence can greatly improve the
predictive power of the utility function. How can one do so? Recent work shows that emotional
content in messages increases their diffusion in social media [79–81]. Translating this finding
in the context of one-shot games, it suggests that the emotions carried by the instructions of the
decision problem might contribute to the computation of Pi. Along these lines, it is possible that
one can use sentiment analysis to better estimate Pi. Sentiment analysis is a technique developed
by computational linguists that allows to assign a polarity to any given piece of text [82]. In
principle, this polarity could enter the utility function of a decision maker and work as an additional
motivation or obstacle for choosing an action, beyond its monetary consequences. In any case,
mathematically describing or at least quantifying the seemingly intangible moral preferences, and
in doing so building bridges between computational linguistics, behavioural economics, and moral
psychology, is a fascinating direction for future work.
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B. Evolution of norms
Where do personal norms come from? One explanation is that they come from the internali-
sation of behaviours that, although not individually optimal in the short term, they are optimal in
the long run. It is therefore important to understand which unselfish behaviours can be selected in
the long term, and under which conditions. A promising line of research uses evolutionary game
theory and statistical physics to find the conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation on
networks [83]. More recently, scholars have started applying similar techniques also to study the
evolution of other forms of unselfish behaviour [84], such as truth-telling in the sender-receiver
game [85, 86] and trustworthiness in the trust game [87]. Some works along this line have also
looked at the evolution of choices in the ultimatum game [88–91]. Future work should extend the
same techniques to other forms of unselfish behaviour.
C. Personal norms versus social norms
The experimental literature reviewed in the previous sections suggests that several forms of
one-shot, anonymous unselfishness can be unified under a framework according to which people
have preferences for following their personal norms. Moreover, preliminary evidence suggests
that nudging personal norms can be an effective tool for fostering pro-sociality: making personal
norms salient affects altruism, cooperation, altruistic punishment, and trade-off decisions between
equality and efficiency [26, 31, 64, 65].
This, of course, does not mean that the social norms play no role at all. For example, nudging
injunctive norms has a significant effect on the one-shot, anonymous, prisoner’s dilemma [31]
and the trade-off game [48]. One question that is still open, however, is whether these effects
are fundamentally distinct from the effect of nudging personal norms. It is indeed possible that
nudging injunctive norms in these games also nudge personal norms, and this is what makes people
change their behaviour. A working paper suggests that people who follow injunctive norms in the
trade-off game are different from those who follow personal norms [48]. Therefore, it is possible
that a larger model taking into account both personal and injunctive norms might have an even
greater predictive power, at least in some contexts, than a model based exclusively on personal
norms. Further experiments comparing the effect of nudging different norms are needed to clarify
this point. The evidence in this case is indeed still lacunar. One study compared the relative effect
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of the descriptive and the injunctive norms in the dictator game, and found that people tend to
follow the descriptive norm [49]. Another study compared the relative effect of nudging personal
norms and the descriptive norms in the trade-off game, and found that people tend to follow the
personal norms [27]. The aforementioned working paper compared the effect of nudging the
personal and the injunctive norm in the trade-off game and found that they have a similar effect;
moreover, when the two norms are in conflict, some people follow the personal norm and other
follow the injunctive norm [48]. This suggests that people’s behaviour depends on their focus of
attention within an interconnected matrix of norms. Therefore, future work should explore norm
salience, also in cases where more than one type of norm is simultaneously made salient.
Research should also go beyond anonymous decisions and investigate what happens when
choices are observable. The intuition suggests that when choices are observable, social norms
may play a bigger role compared to when they remain private; in line with this intuition, Schram
and Charness [24] showed that nudging the injunctive norms impacts public but not private dic-
tator game giving. However, no studies compared the relative effectiveness of targeting different
norms in public decisions.
D. Boundary conditions of interventions based on personal norms
Having in mind potential practical applications, another important question concerns the
boundary conditions of interventions based on personal norms. From a temporal perspective, pre-
vious research suggests that interventions targeting personal norms can last for several interactions
within the same experiment [31, 65]. However, it seems unrealistic to expect that their effect will
last indefinitely. For example, a recent field experiment targeting injunctive norms found an effect
that diminishes after repeated interventions, although it can be restored after waiting a sufficient
amount of time between interventions [92]. From the decisional context point of view, there will
certainly be behavioural domains in which targeting personal norms might not be as effective. For
example, a recent work suggests that risky cooperation in the stag-hunt game is primarily driven
by preferences for efficiency, rather than by preferences for following personal norms [42].
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E. External validity of interventions based on personal norms
Given the potential relevance of this line of work for the society at large, future studies should
explore the external validity of interventions based on personal norms. At the time of this writing,
only one study investigated the effect of nudging personal norms in contexts in which decisions
have consequences outside the laboratory. This study found that nudging personal norms increases
crowdsourced charitable donations to real humanitarian organisations by 44% [31].
F. The moral phenotype and its topology
We have seen that different forms of unselfish behaviour can be explained by a general tendency
to do the right thing. We are tempted to call this tendency “moral phenotype”, extending the notion
of “cooperative phenotype” introduced by Peysakhovich, Nowak, and Rand [46]. See also [47]. In
their work, Peysakhovich and colleagues observed that pro-social behaviours in the dictator game,
the public goods game (a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma with more than two players), and the
trust game (both players) were all correlated; and they termed this general pro-social tendency
cooperative phenotype. Therefore, the cooperative phenotype is uni-dimensional. On the other
hand, the moral phenotype is likely to be multi-dimensional. For example, we have seen earlier
that both altruistic punishment and altruistic giving are driven by preferences for doing the right
thing. However, Peysakhovich, Nowak, and Rand [46] found that they are not correlated. It is
possible that they are not correlated because they come from different personal norms. The multi-
dimensionality of morality is not a new idea, and several authors have come to suggest it in the
last decades from different routes. For example, Haidt and colleagues argue that differences in
people’s moral concerns can be explained by individual differences across six “foundations” [93–
95]. Kahane, Everett and colleagues have shown that (act) utilitarianism decomposes itself in at
least two dimensions [96, 97]. Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse [98] have reported that seven moral
rules are universal across societies, but societies vary on how they rank them. However, we are
not aware of any work exploring how different personal norms link to different forms of one-shot
unselfishness.
Another topological property of the moral phenotype that deserves further scrutiny is the
boundary. Does, for example, the moral phenotype include decisions that are strategically un-
selfish, such as strategic fairness (ultimatum game offers) and trust (trust game transfers), both of
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which maximise the decision maker’s payoff depending on the decision maker’s beliefs about the
behaviour of the other player? Previous evidence is limited and mixed. Bicchieri and Chavez [21]
showed that ultimatum game offers are partly driven by normative beliefs; Peysakhovich, Nowak,
and Rand [46] found that trustees’ decisions correlate with dictator game and public goods game
decisions. By contrast, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov [25] found that trustees’ and proposers’
decisions are not correlated to their measure of norm-sensitivity.
G. A dual-process approach to personal norms
Do personal norms come out automatically, or do they require deliberation? Research recently
explored the cognitive basis of unselfish behaviour, by using cognitive process manipulation, such
as time pressure and cognitive load, in order to favour instinctive responses [99–108]. It has been
shown that promoting intuition favours cooperation [32] and altruistic punishment [109]. The
evidence regarding altruism is instead more mixed [110, 111]. Instead, a meta-analysis suggests
that intuition decreases truth-telling, when lying harms abstract others, while leaving it unaffected
when it harms concrete others [112]. Furthermore, results are inconclusive in the context of trust-
worthiness and the equality-efficiency trade-off (see [113] for a review). This line of work suggests
that whether personal norms come out automatically or require deliberation may not have a general
answer, but might depend on the specific behavioural context, and possibly also on the individual
characteristics of the decision maker. More work is needed to understand which personal norms,
in which context, and for which people, become internalised as automatic reactions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The moral preference hypothesis is emerging as a unified framework to explain a wide range of
one-shot, anonymous unselfish behaviours, including cooperation, altruism, altruistic punishment,
truth-telling, trustworthiness, and the equality-efficiency trade-off. This framework has promising
practical implications, given that interventions making personal norms salient have been shown
to be effective at increasing charitable donations. Future work should explore further mathemat-
ical formalisations of moral preferences in terms of a utility function, investigate the evolution
and internalisation of personal norms, study the external validity and the boundary conditions of
policy interventions based on personal norms, compare the relative effectiveness of targeting dif-
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ferent types of norms, examine the topology of the moral phenotype, and analyse the cognitive
foundations of morality, possibly using a dual-process perspective.
Overall, the goal of this line of research should be to build bridges between different scientific
disciplines to arrive at a better, perhaps more mechanistic, explanation of human decision-making.
The outlined mathematical formalism for morality should be used to inform future models aimed
at better understanding selfless actions, and it should also be used in artificial intelligence to better
navigate the complex landscape of human morality and to better emulate human decision-making.
Ultimately, the goal is to use the obtained insights to develop more efficient policies and inter-
ventions to increase good virtues and decrease bad ones, and to collectively strive towards better
human societies.
The past century has seen strict compartmentalisation of different scientific disciplines leading
to groundbreaking and important discoveries that might had been impossible without it. But while
technology and industry might fare well on idiosyncratic breakthroughs, human societies do not.
The grandest challenges of today remind us that sustainable social welfare and organisation require
a wholesome interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary approach, and we hope this review will be
an inspiration towards this goal.
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Table 1: Glossary of games and unselfish behaviours
Dictator game: We measure altruistic behaviour using the dictator game. The dictator is given
a certain amount of money and has to decide how much of it, if any, to give to the recipient,
who starts with nothing. The recipient is passive.
Prisoner’s dilemma: We measure cooperative behaviour using the prisoner’s dilemma. Two
players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Cooperating means paying a
cost c to give a benefit b > c to the other player; defecting means doing nothing.
Sender-Receiver game: We measure lying aversion using the sender-receiver game. The
sender is given a private information and has to report it to the receiver. In some experiments
the receiver is passive [23, 114], in others is active [34, 36]. Here we focus on the case in which
the receiver is passive. In this case, if the sender reports the truthful information, then the sender
and the receiver are paid according to Option A; if the sender reports an untruthful information,
then the sender and the receiver are paid according to Option B. Only the sender knows the ex-
act payoffs associated to the two options. Depending on these payoffs, one can classify lies into
four main classes: black lies are those that benefit the sender at a cost to the receiver; altruistic
white lies are those that benefit the receiver at a cost to the sender; Pareto white lies are those
that benefit both the sender and the receiver; spiteful lies are those that harm both the sender
and the receiver.
Trade-Off game: We measure the trade-off between equality and efficiency using the trade-off
game. A decision-maker has to decide between two possible allocations of money that affect
people other than the decision-maker. One decision is equal (i.e., all people involved in the
interaction receive the same monetary payoff), the other decision is efficient (i.e., the sum of
the monetary payoffs of all people is greater than it is in the equal allocation).
Trust game: We measure trustworthiness using the second player in the trust game. The truster
is given a certain amount of money and has to decide how much of it, if any, to transfer to the
trustee. The amount sent to the trustee is multiplied by a constant (usually equal to 3) and given
to the trustee. The trustee decides how much of the amount s/he received to return to the truster.
Ultimatum game: We measure altruistic punishment using the second player in the ultimatum
game. The proposer makes an offer about how to split a sum of money between him/herself
and the responder. The responder decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer
is accepted, the proposer and the responder get paid according to the agreed offer; if the offer
is rejected neither the proposer nor the responder get any money. Rejecting a low offer is
considered to be a measure of altruistic punishment.
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Table 2: Social preference models
Let xi be the monetary payoff of player i. Social preference models assume that the utility func-
tion of player i, ui, is defined over the monetary payoffs that are associated with the available
actions. The main functional forms that have been proposed are the following.
Ledyard (1994): ui(x1, . . . , xn) = xi + αi
∑
j 6=i xj , where αi is an individual parameter repre-
senting i’s level of altruism. People with αi = 0 maximise their monetary payoff; people with
αi > 0 are altruistic; people with αi < 0 are spiteful.





xj , where αi is an individual parameter
representing i’s level of altruism, whereas λ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter representing how sensitive
players are to the level of altruism of the other players.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999): ui(x1, . . . , xn) = xi − αin−1
∑




j 6=imax(xi − xj, 0), where αi, βi are individual parameters representing the extent to
which player i cares about disadvantageous and advantageous inequities, respectively








if x1+x2 = 0, αi > 0 is an individual parameter representing the extent to which player
i cares about their own monetary payoff, and βi > 0 is an individual parameter representing the
extent to which player i cares about minimising the distance between their share and the fair
share.
Andreoni and Miller (2002): u1(x1, x2) = (α1xρ11 + (1− α1)x
ρ1
2 )
1/ρ1 , where α1 represents
the extent to which the dictator cares about their own payoff, whereas ρ1 takes into account a
potential convexity in the preferences.
Charness and Rabin (2002): u2(x1, x2) = (ρ2r+σ2s)x1+(1−ρ2r−σ2s)x2. Depending on the
relative relationship between ρ2 and σ2, this utility function can cover several cases, including
competitive preferences, inequity aversion preferences, and social efficiency preferences.
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Table 3: The classification of norms
Behavioural scientists have long been aware of the fact that people’s behaviour in a given con-
text is influenced by what are perceived to be the norms in that context. In the same context,
multiple norms might be at play. Scholars have proposed several norm classifications. In this
review, we will be mainly concerned with the following three.
Schwartz [15] classified norms into two main categories, namely personal norms and social
norms. Personal norms refer to internal standards about what is right and what is wrong in a
given context. Social norms refer to rules and standards of behaviour that affect the choices of
individuals without the force of law. Social norms are typically externally motivated.
Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren [17] focused on social norms and classified them into two main
categories, namely injunctive norms and descriptive norms. Injunctive norms refer to what peo-
ple think others would approve or disapprove. Descriptive norms refer to what others actually
do.
Bicchieri [18] proposed a classification in three main categories, namely personal normative
beliefs, empirical expectations, and normative expectations. Personal normative beliefs refer to
personal beliefs about what should happen in a given situation. Empirical expectations refer to
personal beliefs about how others would behave in a given situation. Normative expectations
refer to personal beliefs about what others think one should do.
Therefore, to the extent to which people believe that what should (or should not) happen in
a given situation corresponds to their internal standards about what is right (or wrong), then
Bicchieri’s personal normative beliefs correspond to Schwartz’s personal norms. In one-shot
anonymous games (where decision makers receive no information about the behaviour of other
people playing in the same role), descriptive norms correspond to empirical expectations (we
replace the actual behaviour of others with the beliefs). Finally, normative expectations corre-
spond to injunctive norms. Therefore, at least for the games and decision problems considered
in this review, Bicchieri’s classification can be interpreted as a synthesis of the previous two
classifications.
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Table 4: The moral preference hypothesis
Previous work explained unselfish behaviour in one-shot, anonymous economic games using
social preferences defined over monetary outcomes. According to this “social preference hy-
pothesis”, some people act unselfishly because they do not only care about their own monetary
payoff, but they also care about the monetary payoffs of other people. However, especially in
the last five years, numerous experiments challenged social preference models. The best way
to organise these results is through the moral preference hypothesis, according to which people
have preferences for following their own personal norms – what they think to be the right thing
to do – beyond the monetary consequences that these actions bring about. This framework out-
performs the social preference hypothesis at organising cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma,
altruism in the dictator game, altruistic punishment in the ultimatum game, trustworthiness in
the trust game, truth-telling in the sender-receiver game, and trade-off decisions between equal-
ity and efficiency in the trade-off game.
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Table 5: Moral preference models
Let a be an action for player i. Moral preference models assume that the utility function of
player i, ui, describes a tension between the material payoff associated to a, vi(πi(a)), and
the moral utility. The main functional forms that have been proposed are the following.
Levitt and List (2007): ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) +m(a). The moral cost or benefit associated
to a, m(a), is assumed to depend on whether the action is observable, on the material
consequences of that action, and on the set of social norms and rules in place in the
society where the decision maker lives.
Krupka and Weber (2013): ui(a) = vi(πi(a))+γiN(a), where γi is the extent to which i
cares about following the injunctive norm andN(a) represents the extent to which society
views a as socially appropriate.
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2020): ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) + φiη(a), where φi is the
extent to which i cares about following the injunctive norm and η(a) represents the extent
to which society views a as socially appropriate. (The main difference between η(a) and
N(a) regards the way they are computed.)
Our proposal: ui(a) = vi(πi(a)) + µiPi(a), where µi represents the extent to which i
cares about following their own personal norms and Pi(a) represents the extent to which
i personally thinks that a is the right thing to do.
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Table 6: Outstanding challenges
• Exploring in which contexts interventions targeting personal norms are more effective at
promoting one-shot unselfish behaviour than interventions targeting social norms.
• Finding the boundary conditions of interventions targeting personal norms.
• Investigating the dimension and the boundary of the “moral phenotype”, to under-
stand how different personal norms can drive different forms of unselfish behaviour and
whether the moral phenotype includes behaviours that are strategically unselfish, such as
strategic fairness and trust.
• Building bridges between computational linguistics, moral psychology, and behavioural
economics, with the goal of understanding how to express people’s utility function also
in terms of the instructions of a decision problem.
• Using techniques from evolutionary game theory, applied mathematics, network science,
and statistical physics to explore which types of unselfish behaviour are more likely to
evolve in order to understand which personal norms are more likely to be internalised.
• Exploring the cognitive basis of personal norms using a dual-process perspective.
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